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Introduction
here was much of pointing ingers in the wake of the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. Economists, politicians and the inancial 
industry itself dwelled to assign blame to what is considered to be the 
most damaging economic crisis since the 1930s Great Depression. 
Undoubtedly, the over-counter- derivatives market has been target for 
criticism on diferent fronts and cast into the limelight. Ruthless press 
articles condemning OTC instruments only helped to fuel the rage and 
social discontent of the thousands of unemployed that emerged ater 
the crash, while  regulators and policy makers seized the opportunity to 
publicly express their disapproval by sentencing the alleged opaqueness 
and complexity of derivative products, while they themselves were the 
ones who pushed for de-regulation and less stringent market oversight 
of what were back then considered “innovative products and good for 
society”.
It would only be a matter of time before he Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) would cease to exist, or at least 
considerably redrated. To those less familiar with the legal world, 
the law is what oicially guaranteed a modernized regulation of OTC 
derivative products. Signed into law on December 21, 2000 by President 
Bill Clinton, it exempted over-the-counter derivatives transactions 
between “sophisticated parties” from being regulated “futures” under 
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) or as “securities” under 
the federal securities laws [1]. Instead, they would be would continue 
to only be accountable to the “Safety and Soundness” standards, which 
it goes without saying, are by far less restrictive and stringent than the 
other two. As a result, the OTC swap market exponentially became 
less transparent than exchange traded products. he lack of clarity of 
what was happening behind the scenes among the major banks, the so 
called “sophisticated parties” is by many considered the main reason 
of why 2008 will be remembered as the year the world fell apart in all 
economic text books yet to be published. AIG’s collapse in September 
2008 is perhaps the epitome in its purest essence of why transparency 
was a core issue that had to be addressed. While iling for bankruptcy, 
no one exactly knew to whom all of AIG’s contracts actually belonged 
to; who the counterparties were and how those products were priced 
and valued. “Prices were murky and risk was interlinked” said Nathan 
Jenner, COO of Fixed Income E- Trading at Bloomberg. Uncertainty 
soon became the watchword across the entire inancial sector.
Swap Execution Facilities
Enclosed in the Dodd-Frank Act, the Wall Street Transparency 
and Accountability Act of 2010, or more commonly referred to as Title 
VII, is the nucleus leading the change, including the change in favor 
of electronic execution. By giving jurisdiction over swaps (derivatives 
tied to commodities or interest rates) to the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) and jurisdiction over security- based 
swaps (derivatives tied to the performance of securities or loans) to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Title VII established 
a completely new comprehensive regulatory framework for swaps and 
security-based swaps. It addresses the hitherto opaque and unregulated 
over the counter derivatives market with the intention of rendering it 
more inancially stable and more transparent. One of the key goals of 
Title VII is to bring greater pre-trade and post-trade transparency to 
the swap market. With respect to the swap market, the former refers to 
accurately indicating every information relevant for prospective trading 
interest including the bid/ask spread and quantity available at those 
prices. On a similar line, post-trade transparency refers to providing 
the trade details ater the completion of every swap transaction [2].
Advocates of greater transparency argue that by making markets 
more competitive and accessible, have a positive knock on efects on 
lowering costs for investors, reducing the risk inherent in the swap 
market and ultimately provide greater protection to market participants 
due to enhanced market integrity. On the other hand however, there is 
a non-indiferent mass opposing to this logic arguing that, especially 
in the context of institutional markets where trades are infrequent 
but large in size, greater transparency may increase market impact of 
trades leading to greater execution costs. It is important to understand 
the means through which regulators intend to bring transparency to 
a sector which since its origin has been characterized by opacity and 
been outside of the regulators domain. his brings us back to our two 
famous words “electronic execution”. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework outlining the 
registration, operation and compliance Swap Execution Facilities have 
to comply with. Title VII deines a Swap Execution Facility (SEF) as 
a “trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the 
ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and ofers made by 
multiple participants in the facility or system and is not a designated 
contract market”.
Swap Execution facilities are the platforms through which 
electronic execution of swap contracts will take place and the means 
through which regulators intend to bring more pre/post-trade 
transparency in the OTC swap market. hey are the clearest example of 
a many-to-many execution model which strongly opposes to what was 
until now the normal way of conducting business i.e. though a one-
to-many (single dealer) platform, where the sponsoring entity will be 
the only liquidity provider to all other counterparties. In broad terms, 
these provisions will essentially divide the OTC derivatives market 
into two. he “Non-standard” trades or trades involving a corporate 
end user will continue to be executed as before i.e. through bilateral 
agreements between the two entities which will ultimately report to 
a clearinghouse. However, the story is quite diferent for all clearing 
eligible products involving inancial entities. Such instruments will 
be required to trade on SEFs. his has given birth to a slightly more 
complex trade reporting ecosystem.
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Title VIII Section 2(h)(8) states that without any exception, “any 
person operating a platform in which more than one market participant 
has the ability to execute or trade swaps with more than one other 
market participant must register either as a SEF unless it is registered 
as a DCM (Designated Contract Market)”.  But when did all of this 
become mandatory? As mentioned earlier, Title VII establishes a 
comprehensive regulatory framework outlining the registration, 
operation and compliance Swap Execution Facilities have to comply 
with. It wasn’t until May 16th 2013, that the CFTC inalized its set of 
guidance and principles applying to the functioning and operation of 
Swap execution facilities. he key dates are the following:
October 2nd, 2013: By this date, all participant platforms were 
required to inalize and submit their application to become a regulated 
Swap Execution Facility, operate per the SEF rules once approved and 
comply with certain swap data repository (SDR) derivatives reporting 
obligations in case any swap transactions took place in its facility. his 
is because as of this date, SEF trading was still not mandatory as no 
swaps were ‘Made available to trade’ (MAT) yet.
February 15th, 2014: Date which market the beginning for certain 
types of swaps to be mandatorily traded of SEFs. As of April 15, 2014 
a subset of IRS Fixed-Float swap and untranched CDX made available 
to trade so far. Any transaction involving a swap that is required to 
mandatorily be cleared must be executed on a Swap Execution Facility 
or DCM unless either that particular type of swap is exonerated form 
any pre-established clearing requirements or neither a SEF or DCM 
require the swap to be made available to trade (MAT).
Swap Execution Facilities, Credit Default Swaps and 
Volume
Credit Default Swaps is one of the asset classes which have been 
afected by the regulatory reforms. Only four types of CDS products 
have been classiied as Made Available to Trade (MAT). As shown in 
the Figure 1 below there has been a drastic fall in volumes for all of the 
four MAT products around the key dates. More precisely, as shown 
volumes in the month of October 2103 have collapsed by 19% with 
respect to the previous month followed by a 37% and 20% drops in the 
months of November and December, respectively. A similar although 
less accentuated trend took place ater February 2015, date of the MAT. 
In fact, in the month of February volumes dropped by 21% before 
recovering their losses in March [3].
he percentage volume drop around these key dates is by far more 
accentuated than in any other period (Figure 2). In fact, the percentage 
volume swings for the other months are quite stable. his is true with 
the exception of October 2014 onwards where volumes fell by 63% 
between October and November before recovering a quarter of the loss 
in December. Interestingly enough, there was neither announcement 
nor any new rules entering into force which were speciically related 
to SEFs. he anomaly in volumes starting from September 2014 is 
most likely a direct result of a change, or at least an “expected change” 
in the macroeconomic stance of the US. With the general consensus 
being that the FED would increase interest rates around the second 
half of 2015, interest rate volatility sharply increase leading to market 
participants to hedge or re-position their portfolios hence explaining 
the steep increase in volumes. From the same graph it is also possible to 
observe that the linear trend line (trend downwards). 
Although the steepness of the curve is nearly lat, this is an indicator 
that all in all, volumes of MAT products are slowly diminishing [4]. 
However, this does not seem to be the case for Non-MAT products 
(Figure 3). In fact, the combined moving average is trending in the 
opposite direction. Non- MAT products also seem to behave in 
the opposite way to MAT products on the irst SEF critical date. In 
October, volumes actually increased by 28% with respect to September, 
followed by a 12% and 8% rise in the months of November and 
December respectively. he behavior is however similar for the MAT 
implementation period. Volumes dropped 12% in Feb with a further 
decline of 18% in March.
A similar story is relected in the percentage change in the number 
of monthly trades. Figure 4 clearly shows that with the exception of 
the November/December 2014 anomaly, trade count volumes have 
dropped the most ater each of the two critical dates. In fact, for 
October 2013, the number of trades for MAT products dropped by 
43% with respect to September, while Non-MAT product volumes fell 
by 30%. Likewise, volumes decreased by 32% and 23% during February 
2014 for MAT and Non-MAT products respectively. However, gross 
notional volumes and trade count volumes have not been the only two 
parameters which have been decreasing on a consistent basis since the 
introduction of SEFs [5]. 
In fact, and perhaps what is even more worrying, is the persistent 
decline in the average trade size for MAT products trade on SEFs. 
Equally interesting, as reported in Figures 5 and 6, is the fact that the 
average monthly trade size for MAT products traded on-SEFs has 
always been lower in comparison to MAT products traded of-SEFs 
 
Source: Authors calculations from Bloomberg.
Figure 1: Individual MAT Gross Notional Weekly Volume ($ Billion).
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(this is actually a good indicator of how greater transparency may be 
detrimental to liquidity and in particular to trade sizes). 
Conclusion
In the wake of the recent inancial crisis, derivative markets have 
been cast into the limelight, oten because of regulators and policy 
maker’s criticism regarding the alleged opaqueness and complexity 
of derivative products and their contribution to potential sources of 
heightened volatility and systemic risk. As a result, a multitude of 
reforms and changes have been implemented across diferent regions, 
which however have oten been criticized as being excessive and 
detrimental to market functionality [6]. One of these cornerstone 
reforms, and perhaps the centerpiece to this short communication, 
is the introduction of swap Execution Facilities (SEFs); regulated 
 
Source: Authors calculations from Bloomberg.
Figure 2: Aggregate MAT Gross Notional Weekly Volume ($ Billion).
Source: Authors calculations from Bloomberg.
Figure 3: MAT and non-MAT Gross national weekly volume ($Billion).
 
 Figure 4: Percentage change in monthly trade counts for MAT andnon-MATproducts.
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platforms for OTC swap trading, that demand certain standardized 
swap products to be executed on a multilateral venue as opposed to 
being traded privately between two parties and far from any regulated 
exchange as it used to be in the past. SEFs are one of the key chapters 
in the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act of 2010, 
a landmark inancial reform bill passed as a response to the recent 
Financial Crisis. Analyzing and evaluating the impact of Swap Execution 
Facilities have in the OTC derivative market, in particular focusing 
on how market transparency and market liquidity have changed 
ater their introduction on February 15, 2014 is of major importance. 
Preliminary analysis shows a gross notional volumes and trade count 
volumes decline and persistent drop in the average trade size for MAT 
products trade on SEFs. his is indeed a good indicator of how greater 
transparency may be detrimental to liquidity and in particular to trade 
sizes. Further compressive research is required to tackle two diferent 
but interrelated issues. he former is to try to understand whether the 
introduction of Swap Execution Facilities is increasing transparency 
in the opaque over the counter derivative market. he second should 
focus on analyzing whether SEFs are having any relevant impact on 
market liquidity.
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Figure 5: Average monthly trade size for MAT products.
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Figure 6: Average trade size for non-Mat products.
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